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Professional Responsibility
By JOHN R. LEATHERS*
Members of the legal profession have generally agreed that
the revelations of Watergate cast long shadows over the profes-
sion and that public confidence in the bar has ebbed. As a
result, by the summer of 1974 rumors around the legal com-
munity in Lexington indicated that the Supreme Court of Ken-
tucky would soon be reacting to the involvement of lawyers in
the Watergate scandals by increasing their disciplinary control
over the Kentucky Bar Association. Although review of the
disciplinary cases handed down by the Court during the 1974-
1975 term did not substantiate those rumors, the cases for the
1975-1976 term show a significant increase in the Court's disci-
plinary activity. A number of these cases are in areas tradition-
ally watched closely by the Court, and the sanctions imposed
have been heavy. The most significant development, however,
is a group of cases in which the Court has taken steps toward
disciplining competence.
It is no surprise that the Supreme Court continues to deal
severely with lawyers who follow a course of conduct unaccept-
able to the profession in a traditional sense. A survey of disci-
pline in state bars in 1974 concluded that all state bars disci-
plined their members for soliciting business, misusing client's
funds, and splitting fees with laymen.' The same survey noted,
however, that despite a disciplinary rule' requiring a lawyer to
be competent in the handling of his clients' matters, no state
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. B.B.A.,
University of Texas at El Paso; J.D., University of New Mexico; LL.M., Columbia
University.
I Marks and Cathcart, Discipline Within the Profession: Is It Self-Regulation?,
1974 ILL. L.F. 193 (1974).
1 DIsciPLiNAY RULE 6-101(a), AMERICAN BAR ASOCLTION CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
REsPoNsBIwLY,[hereinafter cited as DR] which provides as follows:
A lawyer shall not:
(1) Handle a legal matter which he knows or should know that
he is not competent to handle, without associating with him a
lawyer who is competent to handle it.
(2) Handle a legal matter without preparation adequate in the
circumstances.
(3) Neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.
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bar had begun to discipline its members for such violations.'
Three cases from the last term of the Supreme Court, while not
directly addressing the question of competence, do raise related
issues. These cases will be discussed in detail since they indi-
cate an important and praiseworthy new trend in bar disci-
pline. Finally, the cases in both areas of control will be dis-
cussed in terms of the penalties imposed by the Court, examin-
ing the severity of the sanctions and comparing the penalties
imposed by the Supreme Court with those recommended by
the Kentucky Bar Association.4
I. CONTROL OF CONDUCT IN TRADITIONAL AREAS
Misuse of a client's funds has long been regarded as one
of the most serious offenses which a practicing lawyer can com-
mit. The significance of this danger led the American Bar Asso-
3 Marks and Cathcart, supra note 1, at 236.
' Before undertaking an analysis of the cases, a brief discussion of the Kentucky
Bar Association and its disciplinary procedures is in order. Kentucky has an integrated
bar, meaning that each member of the profession in Kentucky must be licensed by the
Kentucky Bar Association in order to practice law. RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 3.030
[hereinafter cited as RSC]. The implications which such licensing carries to the
public bear heavily on the duties of the Bar Association. The integrated bar is not a
creature of statute, but is created by the highest court of the state, which is vested
with its total control. In Kentucky, extensive rules have been formulated by the Su-
preme Court to control the practice of law, admission to practice, and procedure for
both areas. RSC 3.010 et seq. In addition, the Court has the power to control the
unauthorized practice of law. RSC 3.460. The Court utilized this power in the past
term in Kentucky Bar Ass'n. v. Fox, 536 S.W.2d 469 (Ky. 1976), where they fined a
collection agency and permanently enjoined them from the unauthorized practice of
law.
Complaints to the Kentucky Bar Association are referred by the director of the
Association to an Inquiry Tribunal. RSC 3.170. The Tribunal measures the complaints
against the American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility, the stan-
dard of conduct adopted by the Kentucky Supreme Court. RSC 3.130. If the Inquiry
Tribunal decides by majority vote that charges against the lawyer are in order, the
matter is referred to a Trial Committee for findings of fact. RSC 3.190. This procedure
is designed to afford the lawyer an opportunity to be represented and heard on the
charges. All decisions of the Trial Committee are referred to the Board of Governors
of the Kentucky Bar Association, which makes a full review of both fact and law. If
the Board determines that the lawyer is guilty and recommends a punishment more
severe than a private reprimand, the case is referred to the Supreme Court. RSC 3.370.
Under RSC 3.150 disciplinary cases are private matters while pending, so there is
no way to ascertain what happens to a great many of the complaints filed with the
Association. The cases discussed here constitute only those in which the charges were
found by the Board of Governors to be true and a sanction more severe than a private
reprimand was recommended.
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ciation to promulgate a disciplinary rule specifically directed
toward the protection of the clients' property, 5 portions of
which require the creation of a system of separate accounts to
ease a determination of whether a misuse of funds has oc-
curred.' This area is one which the courts of various states have
traditionally controlled very tightly to prevent abuses.7 In view
of this, it is not surprising that in Kentucky Bar Association v.
Friedlander' the Supreme Court permanently disbarred a law-
yer who had misused his clients' funds.
The facts of the Friedlander case appear simple on the
surface but present a strange twist not usually present in such
cases. Checks issued by the lawyer, William Friedlander, on an
escrow account held for a title company were returned for in-
sufficient funds. The checks could not be paid because a por-
tion of the money in the escrow account had been withdrawn
for the benefit of the law firm of which Friedlander was a part-
ner. Friedlander admitted knowing that the escrow account
was technically overdrawn, but stated that he had expected no
trouble because it was a common practice to "play the float."
In simple terms, he was stating that checks were usually paid
because the cash flow in the account concealed the fact that
some $82,000 from the account had been misused. As the Su-
preme Court stated, the misuse of funds belonging to a client
is an offense of the most serious nature. The problem in
Friedlander is in the application of that generality to the pecu-
liar facts of the case because the title company which owned
the funds in question was wholly owned by the law firm of
which Friedlander was a partner. The Court noted that the
partnership meetings of the law firm served as the only meet-
ings for the officers of the title company. Friedlander's testi-
mony, uncontroverted by the Court, indicated that it was com-
mon knowledge in the law firm that the escrow account was
overdrawn and that it was common practice for other members
of the firm to "play the float." Given the relationship of the law
firm to the title company and the knowledge within the law
DR 9-102.
DR 9-102(B)(3).
See, e.g., Peck v. State Bar, 17 P.2d 112 (Cal. 1932); and In re White, 132 A.2d
777 (N.J. 1951).
5 536 S.W.2d 454 (Ky. 1976).
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firm of the condition of the escrow account, the obvious ques-
tion is "How can a person misuse his own money?" Certainly
the normal sanction for such misuse of the escrow account of a
client would have been disbarment, but in this case the client
was in a very real sense the law firm of which Friedlander was
a partner. In light of all this, it would seem that disbarment
was an overly severe penalty.
Another area of traditional bar association control over the
conduct of lawyers involves the splitting of fees with laymen.
To discourage this abuse, one disciplinary rule concerning the
unauthorized practice of law expressly forbids such divisions
However, it is not uncommon to see such divisions in cases
where a layman has been employed to solicit business for the
lawyer."0 In a slightly different factual context the Supreme
Court in Kentucky Bar Association v. Burbank" approved a
public reprimand for a lawyer who had demanded that a com-
mission on the sale of real estate be split with him, even though
he was not a licensed real estate agent. The Bar Association
contended that Burbank attempted to collect the fee in a set-
ting wherein he was not acting within the scope of his duties
as lawyer for his client. The taking of such a real estate fee by
an unlicensed person is violative of Kentucky statutory law,'2
although lawyers are exempt from the provisions if the sale in
question is within the scope of their representation of a client.' 3
Although not discussed by the Supreme Court, the real prob-
lem in a setting like Burbank is that the lawyer, whose sole
compensation is dependent on the purchase and a split fee with
a real estate agent, will not adequately counsel his client on the
wisdom of the purchase. The implication of Burbank is that the
statutory exception allowing a lawyer to sell property and re-
ceive a commission would apply only where the sale was inci-
dental to other employment. This makes little sense. The real
objection in Burbank is the payment by commission and the
securing of that commission from the real estate agent rather
than from the client. The Supreme Court found that such con-
DR 3-102.
See, e.g., In re Cohn, 139 N.E.2d 301 (Ill. 1957).
539 S.W.2d 312 (Ky. 1976).
,2 Ky. REV. STAT. § 324.020 [hereinafter cited as KRS].
,1 KRS § 324.030.
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duct was likely to call the bench and bar into disrepute, and
admittedly it does smack of a shakedown. A conflict of interest
charge might have been more appropriate, but the resulting
penalty would probably have been more severe than a public
reprimand. Also, a conflict of interest charge might not have
been well received because Burbank sought to purchase the
property for his wife. Thus, the peculiar facts of this case, as
in Friedlander, make it a bit out of the ordinary. Given his
relationship to his client, it was the image presented to the
brokers in the shakedown attempt that implicated Burbank,
and hence the penalty was not as severe as it might otherwise
have been.
In addition to the types of conduct traditionally con-
trolled, the Supreme Court has provided a special rule to cover
cases involving lawyers who are convicted of crimes, 4 and the
Court had occasion during the past term to deal with this rule
in two cases. In Kentucky Bar Association v. Vincent, 5 the rule
itself was not involved since the offense for which Vincent was
convicted (tax evasion) was committed before the effective
date of the rule, which was not retroactive." Vincent had failed
to file tax returns for a 3 year period and was convicted and
sentenced to a year in prison. The Court continued to follow its
previous holding in Kentucky Bar Association v. McAfee"7 that
a conviction for tax evasion was not a conviction involving
moral turpitude. Vincent was suspended from practice for 6
months for conduct calculated to call the bench and bar into
disrepute.
James A. King did not fare as well; in Kentucky Bar Asso-
ciation v. King8 he was ordered permanently disbarred. King
had been accused of conspiring to bribe a public official in
Florida and had pleaded nolo contendere to the charge. He was
convicted and sentenced to a 5 year probation. The case is
illustrative of the workings of rule 3.320 of the Rules of the
Supreme Court which provides that any lawyer convicted of a
11 RSC 3.320.
538 S.W.2d 39 (Ky. 1976).
" Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Ball, 501 S.W.2d 253 (Ky. 1971).
" 301 S.W.2d 899 (Ky. 1957).
I 535 S.W.2d 83 (Ky. 1975).
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felony will be disbarred.19 This is a provision which has been
the subject of some controversy, but disbarment seems the only
defensible alternative for those convicted of felonies or other
serious crimes. It is hard to imagine anything that would shake
the confidence of the public more than to allow a convicted
felon to continue in the practice of the law. If he cannot keep
that trust and obey that oath, he should not be allowed to
flaunt his disregard by continuing to practice.
It should be noted that the conduct which the Court found
unacceptable in the preceding four cases was conduct which
might have directly or indirectly affected the interests of
clients. Misuse of funds and fee splitting are directly harmful,
with the former much more serious than the latter. Conviction
of a felony or a serious misdemeanor is indirectly harmful in
that it indicates a bent of character which may suggest that the
lawyer is not likely to perform correctly for a client. The convic-
tions themselves are not dangerous" to clients, but they stand
as a warning about the character of the lawyer convicted, and
the convictions are certainly detrimental to the image of the
legal profession. It is always possible to engage in legal sophis-
try and question the result in any given disciplinary case, but
the distinct feeling gained from these four cases is that the goal
of the Court, protection of the public, is beyond dispute. The
conduct in the cases was not only dangerous to the clients, it
also cast dark shadows over that vast majority of the profession
which is both honest and competent. In a sense the Court was
exercising its power as head of the integrated bar to protect the
reputation of its members not engaged in such conduct. For
those who remember how unpleasant it was during the Water-
gate scandal to admit to being a lawyer, the memory is still too
painful to find fault in Court decisions trying to protect the
image of the profession it supervises. The cases discussed are
illustrative of well-accepted legal principles. Hopefully they
will serve as a warning to potential offenders and a promise to
the public.
,1 Disbarment will also result where a lawyer is convicted of a misdemeanor in-
volving moral turpitude as defined in Colton v. Commonwealth, 454 S.W.2d 698 (Ky.
1970).
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I. CONTROL OF COMPETENCE AND RELATED AREAS
It is likely that unless the various state bar associations
begin to discipline their members for incompetence as well as
for unacceptable forms of conduct, the legal profession will
have the dubious honor of following the medical profession
down the path of expanded malpractice actions. The conclu-
sion in a survey sponsored by the American Bar Foundation,
however, was that no efforts to police competence were being
undertaken. The study suggested that a lack of adequate stan-
dards of competence was the reason for that failure." However,
it has simply become too common to hear lawyers at social
events trading horror stories about incompetent conduct they
have witnessed for the conclusion about lack of standards to be
true. Competent practicing lawyers do know when they have
seen incompetence. Perhaps it is time to remind them that the
incompetent has violated a duty to his client" and that the
witnessing lawyer is under an affirmative duty to report such
violation to the proper authorities.2
While the cases from the last term of the Supreme Court
do not discipline the involved lawyers for incompetence in the
classic sense, they do apply sanctions for neglect in the han-
dling of their clients' cases. Hopefully the distinction between
neg" ence or incompetence and simply neglect, if not readily
apparent, will be seen from a discussion of the facts of the
following three cases.
Duane Vincent, the lawyer involved in Kentucky Bar As-
sociation v. Vincent,"3 had already been disciplined by the
Court for his conviction for tax evasion24 before the complaint
relating to his neglect in handling the affairs of his clients came
before the Court. Count One alleged that Vincent had been
retained to secure a divorce for a woman. After he had filed a
complaint and a reply to a counterclaim of the husband, Vin-
" Marks and Cathcart, supra note 1, at 236.
21 DR 6-101(A)(1) and (2).
"A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation of DR 1-102 shall
report such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act
upon such violation." DR 1-103(A). DR 1-102 provides that a lawyer shall not violate
a Disciplinary Rule.
538 S.W.2d 39 (Ky. 1976).
21 Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Vincent, 538 S.W.2d 39 (Ky. 1976).
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cent told his client that it would be necessary to take a deposi-
tion from a witness on the issue of the client's residency status.
When the client came to Vincent's office with the witness,
however, counsel for the defendant husband did not appear.
The client alleged that the deposition was taken by Vincent's
secretary, although Vincent alleged that he himself took the
deposition. The deposition, notarized by Vincent's secretary,
showed that opposing counsel had been notified and failed to
appear and that the plaintiff was present in person and by
counsel. In any event, Vincent assured his client that the depo-
sition had been filed with the court in which the divorce was
pending and that a decree would be forthcoming. This proved
to be untrue and the client had to obtain other counsel to
complete the divorce. The Court found Vincent guilty of neg-
lect in his failure to file the deposition. 25
The second count in Vincent alleged that Vincent had
been retained to file a damage claim for a client. Vincent told
the client that the claim had been filed. He first said he filed
it in Boone County, then said it was filed in Kenton County,
and finally said that the complaint had been filed in federal
district court in Lexington. In fact, the action had not been
filed at all. Vincent contended that he had failed to file because
the defendant in the action was judgment proof. This certainly
is an unacceptable excuse. Vincent had been retained on a
claim that could be brought in good faith and the client was
entitled to maintain the suit. The fact that recovery of a judg-
ment in the event of victory would not be possible was a factor
of which the client might have been advised in deciding
whether to continue with the claim. The crucial factor is that
the decision belonged to the client, not to Vincent. In no cir-
cumstance did Vincent have the right not to file the claim after
having been paid a retainer to do so. The Supreme Court found
Vincent guilty of neglect in his failure to file and noted that he
had lied to his clients.
The third count in Vincent, which was quite similar to the
second count, alleged that Vincent had been retained to file a
foreclosure suit for his clients. Vincent assured his clients that
21 The evidence was not sufficiently clear to find that he had perjured himself on
the question of his presence at the taking of the deposition. Id. at 40.
[Vol. 65
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the case had been filed in Boone County and told them that
the case probably would be tried in December of 1970. When
nothing more was heard from Vincent, a lawyer from Virginia
made an inquiry on behalf of the clients. Vincent replied to him
that a complaint had been filed and an answer received from
the defendants. In fact, no action in the matter had ever been
taken by Vincent-no complaint had been filed, no answer had
been received, and certainly no trial date had ever been set.
Vincent argued that he had confused the client in this matter
with another client, but the Court did not believe his conten-
tion.26 Vincent also argued that he could not be disciplined in
the matter since his conduct had taken place more than 5 years
prior to the filing of the complaint against him and was there-
fore barred by the statute of limitations.2 The Court correctly
rejected the statute of limitations argument. Since the disci-
pline of lawyers is clearly a matter controlled by the Supreme
Court, there can be no legislative control over that process, 2
and no time limitation can be placed on the process by the
legislature. Vincent was found guilty of neglecting his clients'
case and of lying to his clients, conduct which would bring the
bench and bar into disrepute. It must be agreed that Vincent's
conduct did nothing to improve the image of the profession in
the eyes of the clients whom he neglected and deceived. The
penalty in the case was a 12 month suspension from practice.
The second case from the Supreme Court involving neglect
of clients' affairs was Kentucky Bar Association v. Dillman.2 9
Both counts in that action involved the failure of Gene Dillman
to file legal actions he had been retained to handle. In the first
instance he had been hired to file a bankruptcy petition for a
client who was moving to another state, and as a result of his
failure to file the action, his client lost his house and all the
other property he owned in Kentucky. In the second instance,
in which Dillman was retained to file a damage claim, his
failure to file resulted in the claim becoming barred by the
statute of limitations. The neglected claim appears to have
24 The Court placed emphasis on the fact that the name involved, Boatright, was
not a common name. Id. at 41.
v KRS § 413.120(2).
2 Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Vincent, 538 S.W.2d 39 (Ky. 1976).
" 539 S.W.2d 294 (Ky. 1976).
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been worth in excess of $10,000. In addition, Dillman lied to his
client in telling him that the action had been filed. Dillman
failed to offer any defense to the charges against him, and the
Supreme Court found him guilty on both counts and suspended
him from practice for 12 months. This sanction seems question-
able and hardly severe enough considering the dire conse-
quences to Dillman's clients resulting from his conduct. This
is a factor not present in the Vincent case and hence the identi-
cal sanction in both seems inappropriate. Vincent deserved
his 12 month suspension, but the sanction for Dillman should
have been disbarment.
The third case of neglect heard by the Supreme Court was
Kentucky Bar Association v. Franklin30 in which Britton
Franklin was suspended from practice for 6 months. Franklin
had represented the plaintiff in a divorce action but was unable
to secure a final decree in the action because he had failed to
sign an amended complaint, obtain opposing counsel's signa-
ture to a property settlement, and pay the court costs. Franklin
had been paid in full for his services by the client, which in-
cluded an amount to cover court costs. It was necessary for the
client to retain other counsel to secure a decree and to pay the
court costs which had previously been advanced to Franklin.
As noted by the Court, Franklin should have been charged by
the Bar Association with misuse of his client's funds, which
would have resulted in a much more serious penalty. A second
charge was added to the case after the prosecution of the first
charge had begun alleging that Franklin had lied to bar mem-
bers investigating the first charge when he told them that the
costs had been paid and further that he had planted a letter
in the court clerk's file to substantiate that defense. Having
been found guilty on both counts, Franklin was suspended for
6 months and can count himself lucky on the light sanction
received.
These three cases from the last term involve what should
be called neglect rather than negligence because they involve
a failure to do a promised act rather than the doing of the act
in an unsatisfactory manner" and as a result represent fairly
534 S.W.2d 459 (Ky. 1976).
, The Code of Professional Responsibility distinguishes between the two and
[Vol. 65
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easy decisions. It is not at all difficult to say that a lawyer who
has undertaken to represent a person must in fact act for that
person and that the failure to act at all is unacceptable. The
dire consequences resulting to their clients were compounded
when the lawyers lied about the course of action taken, thus
misleading the clients and preventing them from taking correc-
tive action. The Court was quite correct in taking disciplinary
action against the lawyers involved.
If neglect is unacceptable to the Supreme Court, it is time
for the Court to take an equally firm stand that negligence and
incompetence are also unacceptable. Where a lawyer is in fact
acting, but acting poorly, it is even more misleading to the
client than simple representations that he is acting. It is more
difficult for a client to ascertain that actions are being taken
badly than to ascertain that no actions are being taken at all.
The offenses of negligence or neglect seem equally damaging to
the reputation of the profession. The existence of the licensing
system for lawyers implies that the public can trust a lawyer
to be competent. It is the duty of the Court and the Bar to
advance that confidence. Clients have malpractice options in
cases of negligence just as they do in cases of neglect, but the
existence of that option is not an effective deterrent to such
conduct. The Supreme Court must in the future address the
problem of incompetence. The three cases involving neglect
show a definite trend in that direction.
III. SANCTIONS APPLIED IN DISCIPLINARY CASES
The disciplinary cases decided in the last term reveal an
interesting pattern in the area of sanctions applied.
Lester v. Kentucky Bar Association2 was an action by a
previously disbarred lawyer for reinstatement to the practice of
law. Lester had been disbarred following a federal court convic-
tion of a felony. The Trial Committee had recommended that
Lester be reinstated. The Board of Governors recommended
that the disbarment continue. The Supreme Court continued
the disbarment on the grounds that Lester did not show suffi-
contains a disciplinary rule covering neglect as well as incompetence. See DR 6-101,
supra note 2.
1 532 S.W.2d 435 (Ky. 1975).
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cient rehabilitation and that he might have been engaged in
the practice of law in Kentucky while under the disbarment
order.
In the cases of Burbank3 and Friedlander,34 the Supreme
Court disciplined the lawyers for, respectively, fee splitting and
misuse of a client's funds. In Burbank, the Board of Governors
had recommended a public reprimand and the Supreme Court
concurred. In Friedlander, the Trial Committee had recom-
mended a 1 year suspension. The Board of Governors recom-
mended disbarment and the Supreme Court ordered Friedlan-
der disbarred.
In the criminal conduct cases of Vincent35 and King,36 the
lawyers were disciplined for, respectively, tax evasion and
bribery. The Trial Committee in Vincent had recommended a
public reprimand. The Board of Governors recommended a 6
month suspension and that was the sanction applied by the
Court. King, pursuant to rule 3.320 of the Rules of the Supreme
Court was not heard before any tribunal other than the Su-
preme Court and he was disbarred.
The cases of Vincent,3 Dillman38 and Franklin39 all in-
volved lawyers who neglected the affairs of clients. The Trial
Committee in Vincent had recommended a private reprimand
and the Board of Governors recommended a 30 day suspension
from practice. The Supreme Court suspended Vincent for 6
months. In Dillman, the Board of Governors recommended a 1
year suspension and the Supreme Court concurred. The Trial
Committee in Franklin recommended a 60 day suspension and
the Board of Governors concurred. The Supreme Court sus-
pended Franklin from practice for 6 months.
Two interesting facts emerge from these cases. First, in no
instance did the Supreme Court apply a sanction less severe
than that recommended by the Kentucky Bar Association. It
could be concluded from this that a lawyer who is disciplined
13 Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Burbank, 539 S.W.2d 312 (Ky. 1976).
Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Friedlander, 536 S.W.2d 454 (Ky. 1976).
31 Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Vincent, 538 S.W.2d 39 (Ky. 1976).
Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. King, 535 S.W.2d 83 (Ky. 1975).
Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Vincent, 538 S.W.2d 39 (Ky. 1976).
Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Dillman, 539 S.W.2d 294 (Ky. 1976).
' Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Franklin, 534 S.W.2d 459 (Ky. 1976).
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by the Bar can expect little in the way of relief or comfort from
the Supreme Court. The Kentucky Bar Association might take
note that in some instances they have been too lenient in light
of the sanctions later applied by the Court. The second fact
that emerges is that the Court regards cases of neglect of
clients' affairs in a much more serious light than does the Bar
Association. In the cases of Vincent and Franklin, the Court
applied sanctions which were much more severe than those
which had been recommended. The Kentucky Bar Association
should take this as an indication that it is the desire of the
Court for Bar control over the area to be more thorough and
strict.
IV. CONCLUSION
It should be obvious that the earlier rumors concerning
discipline are true. The Supreme Court is taking very positive
steps to improve the quality of the practice of law in Kentucky
by increasing discipline within the profession. This trend is
both noteworthy and praiseworthy. If the legal profession will
not control itself through the appropriate disciplinary chan-
nels, the public will compel that control through malpractice
actions. The position of the Court as head of the Bar is a bless-
ing in that it leaves the profession outside the control of the
legislature. However, that blessing carries with it a responsibil-
ity for self-discipline. The practicing lawyers in Kentucky
should take note of the recent decisions and help the Court to
restore some of the lost prestige to the profession.
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